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Subsidising Europe’s Industry: is Greece the exception? 
 




Greek exceptionalism is a claim widely made in comparative politics. 
In this article I argue against the proposition that Greece differs 
from the EU norm regarding the disbursement of state aids to 
industry. Using data from the European Commission during the 
period 1992-2004, I subject the argument of Greek exceptionalism to 
a battery of empirical tests. I find that in the cases of total, 
horizontal, and manufacturing aids, Greece is not the exception. 
While Greece behaves differently in the cases of sectoral and 
regional subsidies, the “outlier” effect disappears in the case of 
sectoral subsidies once the impact of Simitis’ government and 
economic development are taken into account. Contrary to previous 
estimations of Greece as “the black sheep,” the country behaves 
quite normally by EU standards. 
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Until recently, Greece was openly characterized in numerous European 
publications as the “sick man of Europe” (“The Sick Man of Europe”1992). 
Analysts and politicians alike have questioned the country’s European 
orientation wondering whether it should even be expelled from the European 
Union (EU) as a non-conforming member of the European family of nations 
(Simons 1991). While much of the criticism was sparked by Greece’s 
economic performance and policy toward Yugoslavia, the claim has deeper 
roots, grounded in past institutional, political, and cultural national 
peculiarities.  
Interestingly, many Greeks use the same rationale to justify or explain the 
selective interpretation and implementation of Greek policies that supposedly 
deviate from EU norms (Radin 1992; Simitis 2005: 34; Athens News Agency 
2005). This is equally true in foreign and domestic economic policies. Unlike 
the market-driven policies which have been fairly widely implemented in the 
rest of the EU, the majority of Greeks still felt until recently that the state’s job 
is to satisfy popular demands and subsidize or prevent failing enterprises from 
closing their doors (Simitis 2005: 35). Although the criticism has subsided of 
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late, the country is still characterized in the academic world, with qualifications 
of course, as clientelist, corrupt, and economically still heavily state-dependent 
(Featherstone 2005). 
I argue against this view. To be sure, I am not arguing that Greece was never 
the exception. I merely present empirical evidence from state aids policy 
(1992-2004) which demonstrates that contrary to this lingering (more or less) 
and widely held belief, Greece behaves quite normally in line with other EU 
states. The case of state aids policy is important because it represents the heart 
of the EU’s liberal, market model. For example, the 2000 Lisbon Agenda, 
among others, makes it very clear that EU members commit to liberalizing their 
markets to achieve the world’s most competitive economies in ten years. If 
Greece is the exception it is made to be, then deviation from the EU norm, i.e., 
state-led industrial policies, should be most obvious in this policy sector. 
I first build a model of state aids policy which explains why EU countries 
subsidize their industries. The model estimates the benchmark against which 
Greek deviations will be measured. I then use pooled time series analysis to 
explore Greek exceptionalism. If I find any, I proceed to test why this may be 
the case. The study ends with implications for the study of Greek politics.} 
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2. A model of state aid allocations  
Increasing globalization is widely held to be responsible for national industrial 
subsidies. I use a model developed by Crepaz (2001) to estimate state aids 
allocations. Its essence is very simple. Increasing exposure to external 
economic forces creates domestic winners and losers. The industrial losers 
demand redistributive benefits from national governments so that they may stay 
afloat and continue to employ local workers. However, the effects of 
globalization are frequently felt indirectly. National institutions refract the 
impact, conditioning access by social actors to the levers of power on the one 
hand, and shaping the willingness of politicians to respond to domestic 
demands on the other. 
 
2.1. The impact of globalization  
The preferences of domestic actors are shaped by exposure to external 
economic forces. Their willingness to act depends on the rate of return to assets 
(Frieden and Rogowski 1996). It is reasonable to conclude that when rates of 
return increase, actors will favor these activities. When rates fall, actors will do 
one of two things. First, they may move their assets across industries in search 
of higher rates of return. This act depends on the cost of moving. Quite often 
the cost is substantial depending on the sector and government regulations. For 
example, some sectors, e.g., oil extraction, require considerable sunk costs 
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before owners see any profits. Such barriers to entry discourage potential 
entries, making it less likely that asset owners will move quickly or cheaply.  
Second, faced with falling rates of return, actors will lobby governments to 
increase profitability. Depending on the magnitude of losses and the 
unavailability of credible alternatives, groups will coalesce to demand 
subsidies. The argument is familiar. Foreigners are competing unfairly and take 
away jobs from local communities. In response, workers and employers 
coalesce to demand protection. Policy makers in democratic environments have 
powerful incentives to respond favorably by saving jobs and gaining votes 
(Dixit and Londregan 1995; Zahariadis 1997).  
In order for domestic firms to compete more effectively, governments need to 
“level the playing field” (Snape 1991). They may impose tariffs, quotas, and 
the like or impose barriers in the domestic economy. An important and 
frequently used instrument of protection is state aids. This is particularly true in 
recent years because successive rounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade and its successor, the World Trade Organization, have made the 
imposition of tariffs politically very costly. Even more so, in the EU case the 
treaties of Rome and subsequent amendments explicitly refer trade matters to 
EU competence, rather than national jurisdiction, making it very difficult for 
each country to impose its own trade barriers. 
I make two assumptions. First, I assume owners find it very costly to move 
their assets to more profitable domestic uses. Rather, faced with decreasing 
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rates of return and lacking other viable alternatives, domestic firms will lobby 
national politicians for protection. Second, I assume that European politicians 
provide protection in the form of subsidies. There are of course other forms of 
protection, but subsidies are direct and depending on the form they take—e.g., 
grants, loans, tax breaks, equity infusions, and the like—they can be less 
transparent than tariffs. The latter point is important because democratic 
politicians calculate the degree of “optimal obfuscation,” preferring instruments 
of protection that are less visible for vote-getting reasons (Kono 2006). 
Not all globalization is created equal. Few analysts differentiate between the 
various dimensions of economic globalization although they have important 
effects on the question at hand. I differentiate between three dimensions: trade, 
foreign direct investment (FDI), and portfolio investment. As international 
competition intensifies, the groups that lose domestic market share demand 
subsidy protection. Domestic producers demand subsidies to lower production 
costs and consumer prices, such as subsidizing labour wages or achieving 
economies of scale through equity participation or debt forgiveness. Anecdotal 
evidence abounds regarding rising trade with low cost producers, such as 
China, and the willingness of national governments, such as those in Italy or 
the United Kingdom, to protect domestic producers of shoes and garments. 
Empirical analysis has also found a strong correlation between increasing 
exposure to trade and the redistributive capacity of the state. Cameron (1978), 
Rodrik (1998), and Crepaz (2001) among others have found that a country’s 
openness, i.e., its total annual trade over economic output, is an important 
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determinant of government expenditures. Greater exposure to trade increases 
significantly government expenses, many of which are geared toward 
compensating the losers from globalization. Zahariadis (2001; 2002) provides 
more specific quantitative evidence linking international trade to rising 
subsidies. 
However, investment has a differential impact on the propensity of national 
governments to grant protection. While FDI positively affects the propensity of 
policy makers to disburse more subsidies, portfolio investment has a negative 
impact. The difference is attributed to barriers to entry and exit. In the case of 
FDI, losses are immediate and the possibility of redress political in the sense 
that there exist high barriers to exit. Investing in immobile assets, such as 
building factories, requires significant investment up front. For this reason, 
producers will not exit easily; but governments still have to respond to 
demands for state aids. Because short-term investment, such as portfolio 
investment, involves fewer sunk costs and can move more easily in and out of 
national borders, it has a negative effect on protection. Governments have to 
ensure that assets are used as efficiently as possible to maximize returns. State 
aids are indicators of inefficiency. Assuming that portfolio investment provides 
much desired capital, governments are less willing to intervene through 
subsidies for fear of capital flight. In this case, governments in more heavily 
exposed economies disburse on average fewer subsidies. 
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2.2. The impact of national institutions 
National political institutions refract the effects of globalization. Incentives to 
demand and supply rewards are carefully circumscribed by the political 
institutional system within which groups and governments operate. National 
institutions regulate the organizational capacity of groups to access policy 
makers and get subsidies (Zahariadis 2005).  
Economic policies are not made in an institutional vacuum (Garrett and Lange 
(1996).1  Actor “behavior is deeply conditioned by [the] institutional 
environment” within which actors are embedded (Hall 1999, 148). Once 
institutionalized relationships are taken into account, it becomes easier to see 
how the translation of actor preferences into political demands is partly shaped 
by national political institutions. While there is regional variation, national 
institutions are important because a national institutional framework frames 
actor incentives and constrains microeconomic behaviour (Soskice 1999). 
Veto points make a big difference in determining the outcome of domestic 
struggles for protection. Groups arguing for subsidies must overcome the 
opposition of other groups who may be adversely affected by the proposed 
measures. For example, subsidizing domestic steel producers affects 
automobile manufacturers and the construction industry because steel is an 
important raw material input in those industries. If subsidies make steel 
                                                 
1
 I am cognizant of the fact that there are formal and informal institutions with significant 
differences, and power, among the two. I follow Garrett and Lange and look at only formal 
institutions here. 
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cheaper, these industries will cheer; if not,2 they will doggedly oppose 
protection. Each political system is structured in specific ways to regulate, 
limit, or encourage access by groups into the process of policy making 
(Zahariadis 2006b). 
Birchfield and Crepaz (1998) describe national institutional arrangements by 
way of veto points. They divide points in two types: collective and competitive 
veto points. They are two qualitatively different forms of diffusing political 
power, which have redistributive implications.  
Collective veto points refer to consensual institutional incentives that enable 
access to a broad array of actors and “force” political bargains to be made in 
the face of conflict and adversity. The best way to conceptualize this dimension 
is through a continuum of shared responsibility and collective agency on the 
one hand and divided agency and responsibility on the other (Goodin 1996). 
Collective veto points disperse political power within institutions. Under these 
conditions, policies tend to be more responsive to different interest groups 
because of “logrolling.” As the number of collective veto points goes up, 
subsidy protection rises. Institutions, such as multiparty coalition governments, 
corporatism, and proportional representation, tend to force bargaining and 
logrolling among participants. Because the assent of many parties is needed in 
order to form a government or pass legislation, compromises will include 
satisfying a higher number of claimants than would otherwise be the case. 
                                                 
2
 Subsidies don’t necessarily imply lower prices. Savings realized by state aids may be used to 
lower costs and increase profits, leaving prices unaffected. 
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Groups adversely affected by trade push for these types of bargains on a 
continuous basis, driving up government expenditures (Crepaz and Moser 
2004). In countries with such “enabling” institutions, protection is more likely 
to be the outcome. 
Competitive veto points refer to a situation where political power is diffused 
among different and separate institutions—e.g., bicameralism, federalism, 
independent central banks, and the like. In this case, actors hold mutual veto 
powers, leading occasionally to deadlock and immobilism. Competitive veto 
points are what most analysts understand veto points to be. While policy 
change may be more difficult in cases of higher number of competitive veto 
points (Tsebelis 2002; Crepaz and Moser 2004; O’Reilly 2005), protection also 
comes in higher levels. For example, the presence of a bicameral legislature 
means that more access points are available to ask for subsidies. If the U.S. 
House of Representatives votes down the request, there is always the Senate. In 
light of the fact that powers are effectively equal, that is, each chamber holds 
veto power, the chances of getting subsidized increase. The literature is replete 
with such institutional venue-shopping in search of the chamber with the most 
favorable response to societal demands (e.g., Jones and Baumgartner 2005). 
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3. Is Greece the exception? 
I have built a model which explains the likelihood of subsidization in the EU. 
The model establishes the benchmark against which to judge Greek state aids 
policy. Are there reasons to suggest Greece deviates from this norm? 
Although the question of state aids has not yet been analyzed, there is a general 
literature pointing to Greek exceptionalism. For one, many studies of Greek 
politics and economics compare the country alongside other Mediterranean EU 
members—Spain, Portugal, and to a lesser extent Italy—implying that 
Southern Europe is somehow different from the rest of Europe (Castles 1998; 
Sotiropoulos 2004). Economically less developed, culturally and politically 
distinct, countries in Southern Europe have been branded more or less as 
outliers. Tsoukalis (1981: 254) speaks of a unidirectional North-South axis 
along which goods and ideas flow. Even within such comparisons, Greece is 
frequently found to be a cultural, political, and bureaucratic exception, again 
implying that it is an even greater outlier (Pagoulatos 2004). 
The cultural bases for this deviant behaviour are best articulated by 
Diamandouros (1993) and his concept of the “culture of the underdog.” 
Contrasted with the liberal-leaning, Enlightenment-inspired, European value-
minded model, Greece’s exceptional culture is described as a hyperbolic sense 
of self-importance in international affairs, a profound sense of cultural 
inferiority, and a siege mentality leading to defensive reactions to the 
international environment. As Prime Minister K. Simitis (2005: 34) writes 
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regarding Greece-EU relations, Greeks accepted willingly economic subsidies 
and other support but “there would be neither negotiations, because they were 
considered to be sell-outs, nor understandings, because they created national 
threats.” 
Political parties, especially the socialist PASOK, nurtured this culture to gain 
votes. Being the party of the anti-establishment in the 1970s, PASOK 
vehemently promoted national independence as the supreme priority and 
viewed membership in the European Communities at the time as subjugation to 
imperialism (Verney 1996). Although the socialist leader A. Papandreou 
eventually moderated his stance vis-à-vis Europe, he indulged in a policy of 
subsidizing entire classes of voters, such as farmers and public sector 
employees, in the name of socialism and righting past wrongs, drawing on 
mostly European funds. As Pagoulatos (2004: 62) aptly puts it, “national 
exceptionalism in post- transition Greece [since 1974] was both empirically 
plausible and politically beneficial.” 
As a consequence, the state’s role in the economy increased dramatically. The 
rate of deindustrialization accelerated in the early 1980s partly as a result of the 
shock of EC membership (Markou et al. 2001; Hassid 1994). Having 
nationalized failing enterprises in the early 1980s, PASOK continued the 
government’s heavy involvement in economic affairs by bloating the public 
sector with party loyalists. The Greek bureaucracy became even more 
disorganized and less skilled, relative to its EU counterparts (Sotiropoulos 
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2004). It proved unable to achieve the government’s ostensible objectives of 
encouraging firm competitiveness and turning around the failing enterprises it 
had nationalized a few years back. At a time when other EU members were 
experimenting (with varying zeal) with market reforms, Greece seemed trapped 
by exploding government budgets and deteriorating macroeconomic 
conditions. 
Although many of these peculiarities find support in the country’s historical 
trajectory, they can be substantively summarized under the rubric of 
underdevelopment. Indeed, state-led development was crafted by political elites 
in the 1950s and 1960s as a way of overcoming the small size of the Greek 
market, the shallowness of its interest-mediating institutions, the lateness of its 
capitalist development and weakness of capitalist institutions, the country’s 
polarized politics, and the lack of meaningful political participation (Kazakos 
2001; Pagoulatos 2003). The creation of clientelist networks and strong 
reliance on the part of entire groups on the Greek state for their welfare in the 
last forty years or so are symptoms of economic insecurity and political 
deprivation (Simitis 2005). The lower a country’s level of economic 
development, the less self-reliant its productive classes will be. Alternatively, 
as incomes rise, heavy state intervention is likely to subside. 
H1: As the level of economic development rises, the amount of state 
aids falls. 
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Opinions differ as to why and when steps were taken to reduce the country’s 
exceptional economic behaviour. It is hard to disentangle the reasons behind 
this change in course, but it is certain that it was caused by a combination of 
domestic politics—the macroeconomic crisis at the time, ideology, and the 
need of present governments to attain legitimacy by distancing themselves 
from the past—and external pressure—the European Commission, 
globalization more generally, and the desire to join the impending economic 
and monetary union (EMU) (Ioakimidis 1998; Dalis 1998; Mitsos and 
Mossialos 2000). Looking at privatization efforts, Pagoulatos (2005) argues 
that the impetus for Greek privatizations was first introduced by the 
conservative government of New Democracy in 1990-1993 for ideological and 
pragmatic reasons, i.e., pressure by the Commission. The model was later 
amplified and expanded by the socialists, creating a dynamic that encouraged 
greater convergence with European norms and less exceptionalism. Similar 
shifts in government policy and public opinion (initially timid and sector-
specific) were also noted by other analysts regarding firm behaviour in a host 
of technology-heavy sectors, academia, and others (Frangakis and 
Papayannides 2003: 173; Kazakos and Ioakimidis 1994).  
Others argue that a rift with the country’s past occurred with the election of K. 
Simitis as Greek Prime Minister in 1996. Stressing the idea of modernization 
and firmly anchoring the country into the EU, Mr. Simitis sought to “reinvent” 
Greece by engaging in structural and economic reforms. The main aim (though 
not the only one) was to revitalize the macroeconomy so that Greece could 
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converge with other EU members and enter the economic and monetary union 
(Simitis 2005). As a corollary of this effort, government budgets were slashed, 
tax collections were strengthened, and inflation was tamed (Christodoulakis 
2000). Implicit was a conscious effort to reduce industrial subsidies, in order to 
combat the clientelist character of the state (Simitis 2005: 534-35). As 
Featherstone (2005: 228) aptly says, modernization aimed to forge a “break 
with the incestuous ‘rousfetti’ politics or bureaucratic clientelism of the recent 
past.” 
H2: The government of Mr. Simitis disbursed fewer subsidies. 
Evidence of success remains mixed. The experience of public works in the 
Greek economy has indeed been transformative (Paraskevopoulos 2005). 
Drawing mainly on the €24.9 billion disbursed by the third Community 
Support Framework (CSF), Greece was able to improve its infrastructure 
dramatically. This is no small feat because as Simitis (2005: 207) informs, 
“never before had the country managed so many funds in such a short time.” 
However, other studies paint a more sombre picture. Zahariadis (2006a) 
concludes that despite significant improvement in macroeconomic indicators, 
structural reforms remain incomplete and limited. Efforts to liberalize the 
Greek labour market failed miserably, while attempts to reform the ailing 
pension system were largely blocked by intense opposition (Papadimitriou 
2005; Tinios 2005). 
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Figure 1. Trends in Greek and EU-15 State Aid, 1992-2004 
 
Source: European Commission (2006); State aid excluding agriculture, fisheries and 
transport. 
 
Despite theoretical expectations in favour of exceptionalism, a preliminary 
visual inspection of the state aid data yields inconclusive results (Figure 1). 
Looking at total aid disbursements (minus agriculture, fisheries, and transport), 
reveals a wide distance between EU and Greek state aid in the first two years 
under study. Greek aid dropped precipitously in the first two years under 
investigation, reaching levels well below the EU average, only to rebound in 
1994. These years coincide with the conservative years in power. Under the 
socialists who ruled from the end of 1993 to early 2004, the volume of aid 
covaries with that of the EU average only to diverge again beginning in 2001. 
However, Mr. Simitis, the man who many credit with changing the way Greece 
“does business,” did not come to power until 1996. State aid allocations 
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covaried with the European average before then and diverged (in the sense of 
fewer disbursements) during the latter part of his tenure in power. 
 
4. Data and methods  
The dependent variable is state aids, defined by the European Commission as 
competition-distorting government assistance to industry. It includes only 
annual funds disbursed by national treasuries and incorporates data for 14 EU 
members during the period 1992-2004.3 Unfortunately, lack of comparable data 
preclude going further back.  
State aids are divided into five elements. The first includes total aid 
disbursements expressed as percent of annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
Horizontal aids refer to subsidies applicable throughout the economy, such as 
R&D or environmental aid. Sectoral aids refer to assistance to either specific 
firms or firms in specific sectors, such as textiles, automobiles, and the like. 
Regional aid refers to funds disbursed to specific territorial regions of the 
country. Finally, aid to manufacturing narrows down subsidies to only 
manufacturers as opposed to, say, transport. Because of the small amounts 
relative to GDP, all figures except total aid are expressed in constant 1995 
euros (re-referenced to 2004) and are logarithmically transformed to the natural 
base. In the latter case, I include GDP amounts, expressed in deflated dollars 
                                                 
3
 They include all EU members at the time – Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Austria, Finland and 
Sweden (since 1995). Luxemburg was dropped because of its unusually small size and the 
fact that most state aid is given to only one sector, railroads. 
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(using the consumer price index) and logarithmically transformed, in the right 
hand of the equation to account for the impact of economic size. Absolute 
figures of aid and percentages of total aid are taken from the European 
Commission (2006) and GDP data for all but the case of total aids are taken 
from OECD (2006). 
The independent variables include the following. Greece is measured by way of 
a dummy variable. If there are systematic differences between Greece and the 
EU average, the indicator should be statistically significant. If this is the case, I 
test for two explanations. First, I include a dummy variable to account for the 
Simitis factor, which takes the value of 1 for the Greek years 1997-2004.4 If the 
modernization drive of Mr. Simitis makes a difference, there should be a 
negative sign. During his tenure in power, state aids are expected to fall. 
Second, I account for the level of economic development. Lower levels of 
economic development are associated with higher state aids. Economic 
development figures, GDP per capita in deflated dollars (using the consumer 
price index), are taken from OECD (2006). 
Globalization and national institutions estimate the benchmark against which 
Greek policy is tested. Globalization has three dimensions. Trade openness is 
measured as annual percent of exports plus imports of goods over GDP. FDI 
openness (or long-term) and portfolio (or short-term) investments are expressed 
in millions of U.S. dollars, converted into percentages of GDP. Higher levels of 
                                                 
4
 I begin with 1997 rather than 1996 because today’s policy makers determine tomorrow’s 
budget. Hence decisions for lowering subsidies in 1996 were taken prior to Mr. Simitis 
coming to power). 
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the indicators signify higher levels of openness. Data on trade and GDP are 
taken from OECD (2006). FDI figures are from OECD (2005) and portfolio 
investment from IMF (various years). 
Veto points are captured by the use of two indicators from Lijphart (1999). 
Competitive veto points, which correspond to what Lijphart terms the “federal-
unitary” dimension, are expressed as an index number, the higher end of which 
denotes more veto points. Collective veto points, which correspond to the 
“executives-parties” dimension, are also expressed as an index number, the 
higher end of which denotes greater tendency toward shared responsibility and 
consensus democracy. 
I use pooled time series analysis to analyze the data. Tolerance and variance 
inflation factors suggest unproblematic collinearity (Fox 1991). Unfortunately, 
examination of the Durbin-Watson statistic reveals the presence of strong serial 
correlation within units. For this reason, I transform the data via the Prais-
Winsten technique, which includes an AR(1) estimation that retains the first 
observation. Panel data of this kind also frequently suffer from 
heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation of errors. To tackle these 
problems, Beck and Katz (1995) recommend calculating panel-corrected 
standard errors. There exists also the possibility of endogeneity. Subsidies 
today may theoretically affect future levels of exposure to globalization, i.e., 
trade, FDI, and portfolio investment. In this case, Wooldridge (2002) 
recommends two-stage least squares regression. I ran it, using instruments for 
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the globalization variables with values of t-2. In the tables below I report both 
estimations. 
To capture the budgetary logic of the puzzle of subsidies, I lag only the 
globalization indicators by one year so that, say, trade openness at time t-1 is 
used to explain the disbursement of state subsidies at time t. The remaining 
variables are time invariant. 
 
5. Analysis and findings 
Does the country systematically allocate more (or fewer) state aids than the EU 
average? I examine the question in two stages. First, I test whether Greece is 
the exception in reference to the EU. Second, if this is the case, I run separate 
equations to examine why. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics (averages for period 1992-2004) 
     EU  Greece 
 
Trade Openness (% GDP)   38.77  23.97 
 
FDI Openness (% GDP)     9.68   0.91 
 
Portfolio Openness (% GDP)  18.82   4.70 
 
Collective Veto Points       .34   -.74 
 




Table 2. Impact on total, horizontal, and manufacturing subsidies 
Variable   (1)a (1)b  (2)a (2)b        (3)a       (3)b 
 
 
logGDP      1.130 1.016         1.16        .960    
       (.076)**(.144)**    (.104)**(.171)** 
Trade Openness  -.011    -.011  -.006   -.014       -.008      -.014 
    (.003)** (.006)  (.003)*  (.011)      (.005)     (.013) 
FDI Openness   -.0005 -.004  -.0009  .0004      -.001       -.002 
    (.001) (.003)  (.001) (.003)     (.001)      (.004) 
Portfolio Openness  .002 .004  .0006 .004      .001         .006   
    (.001) (.001)** (.001) (.002)*     (.002)     (.002)** 
Collective Veto Points  .203 .158  .394 .368     .388         .288 
    (.066)**(.104)  (.058)**(.106)**   (.072)** (.139)* 
Competitive Veto Points .046 .040  .070   .155     .142          .239 
    (.033) (.072)  (.067)  (.053)**    (.062)*    (.098)* 
Greece    .341 .139   .624    .427       .682        .290 
    (.183) (.146)  (.402)  (.291)      (.352)      (.324) 
Constant   1.161 1.14  -7.50 -5.79      -7.80       -4.92 
    (.185)**(.207)** (1.06)**(2.18)**   (1.41)** (2.51)* 
 
 
Adjusted R-squared  0.246 0.181  0.927 0.883       0.869     0.834 
Rho    0.676   0.752        0.717          
 
Notes: * .05≥p>.01; ** p≤.01; two-tailed. a: Prais-Winsten estimates with panel-corrected 
standard errors in parentheses (N=173); b: 2SLS regression with robust standard errors in 
parentheses (N=159); (1): Total subsidies as percent of GDP; (2): Horizontal subsidies in 
constant euros logarithmically transformed; (3): Subsidies to manufacturing in constant euros 
logarithmically transformed.  
 
A visual inspection of the descriptive statistics increases the suspicion that 
Greece may indeed be the exception. Table 1 clearly shows that the Greek 
period average relative to the EU as a whole is substantially lower. Greece is 
less open in terms of trade by 60 percent. Whereas the country receives on 
average 40 percent less portfolio investment that the EU average, FDI receipts 
differ dramatically by a magnitude of almost 10. Greece is also institutionally 
less consensual and more centralized, i.e., it has fewer collective and 
competitive veto points. 
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As a general EU benchmark, national institutions appear to have the greatest 
impact on state aids allocation. The expectation is consistently confirmed that 
as consensus goes up, i.e., the number of collective veto points increases, 
disbursement of state aids also increases. This makes sense because as the 
number of coalition partners rises, more industrial assistance is needed to 
satisfy diverse group interests. This is consistently true across five estimations. 
The same can be said about the role of competitive veto points, albeit with 
more exceptions. As governments devolve power to lower levels of 
government, i.e., they become less unitary, the presence of potentially more 
opposition at those levels requires more industrial subsidies. Interestingly, 
globalization variables are in the opposite direction from that anticipated, 
although they play a lesser role in state aids allocation. For example, when 
trade openness goes up by 1 percent, total aid falls by .011 percent. 
Contradicting previous studies which found a positive relationship between 
trade and protection (e.g, O’Reilly 2005; Zahariadis 2002; 2005; 2006b), more 
exposure to trade and FDI leads to fewer subsidies. Perhaps European countries 
have reached a point of diminishing returns. Because many of them have been 
heavily exposed to global economic forces for a long time, domestic producers 
have had time to adjust to the vagaries of the global market. Inefficient 
producers have for the most part gone out of business and those remaining 
relish the possibility of gaining greater export market share. For example, 
greater exposure to global markets has increased company profitability in 
Germany in recent years (Benoit and Milne 2006). Annual increases in 
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openness, therefore, may not generate demands for more compensatory aid to 
deal with losses.  
Table 3. Estimating the impact on sectoral and regional subsidies 
Variable  (1)a (1)a (1)b  (2)a (2)a   (2)b 
 
logGDP  .655    1.04      1.03     1.31    1.65     1.77     
                                    (.250)**(.228)**(.462)*  (.247)**(.181)** (.377)** 
Trade Openness -.019  -.004  -.015  .003 .018         .023 
              (.014)    (.014)   (.021)  (.010) (.008)*  (.024) 
FDI Openness  -.001     -.002     -.013  -.005     -.005     -.008 
              (.008) (.008) (.006)*  (.003) (.002)*   (.007) 
Portfolio Openness .002  .005      .016  .002      .003       .008 
              (.004) (.004) (.003)** (.002)  (.002)   (.004) 
Collective Veto Points -.283     -.050 -.033  -.034     .141       .201 
              (.185) (.193)   (.349)  (.232) (.168)    (.279) 
Competitive Veto Points .492     .438       .376  .167    .113      .121 
              (.221)* (.188)*   (.345)  (.124) (.084)   (.151) 
Greece   -1.683   -.085      -.769  1.875    2.185      2.405 
                                      (.650)** (.687)   (.589)  (.639)**(.526)** (.589)** 
Simitis    -2.91  -2.76   -.351        -.830 
                (.660)** (.301)**  (.425)      (.197)** 
logGDP/Per Capita  -3.77   -4.78   -2.48   -3.27 
                (.949)** (1.73)**  (.629)** (1.14)** 
Constant  -1.80 30.41     41.08   -11.56     8.34      14.43    
               (3.53)   (9.30)**(11.57)** (3.48)**(6.68)   (8.89) 
 
Adjusted R-squared 0.459 0.513 0.666  0.728 0.766    0.784 
Rho   0.646 0.602   0.824 0.735 
Notes: See notes in Table 2. * .05≥p>.01; ** p≤.01; two-tailed 
 
However, the conclusion of Greek normalcy is not uniform across aid 
objectives. As Table 3 shows, Greece is exceptional in the cases of sectoral and 
regional subsidies. In the case of sectoral subsidies, the model overpredicts 
Greek behaviour, that is, actual state aid levels in Greece are lower that the EU 
average, and it underpredicts regional aid. In other words, Greece is a “good” 
exception in the case of sectoral subsidies, assuming that more sectoral and 
regional aid are “bad,” and a “bad” exception in regional subsidies. This 
finding is consistent across equations and estimations. 
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The effect of Greek exceptionalism, however, disappears in sectoral subsidies 
once the explanation accounts for the impact of the Simitis government and 
level of economic development. Indeed, the Simitis variable is in the 
hypothesized direction and suggests that subsidies were systematically lower 
during his tenure in power. This serves as evidence that his modernization drive 
actually worked. Despite spectacular failures—e.g., the inability to sell 
Olympic Airways, now renamed Olympic Airlines (Featherstone and 
Papadimitriou 2007)—his effort to reduce firm dependence on state hand outs 
bore fruit. Moreover, the level of economic development also plays a role. As 
per capita income rose during this period, sectoral aid decreased. 
The same can be said about regional aid although in that case Greece continues 
to be exceptional. Even when accounting for the Simitis effect and economic 
development, the dummy variable is consistently significant across estimations 
and equations. To be sure, the effects are in the hypothesized direction, but the 
Greek exception remains strong. It is possible that Greece allocates more 
regional state aid because the country receives on average more EU regional 
funds than others. Greek regional aid, unlike sectoral aid, tends to be tied to a 
large extent to matching EU structural funds. Because the amounts are fixed 
over a long period of time, for example the third CSF lasted from 2000 to 2006, 
a study such as mine which tracks annual variations cannot possibly tell the 
whole story. 
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National institutions and globalization seem to play a lesser role in sectoral and 
regional aid. Unlike in the previous three cases, collective veto points are in the 
hypothesized direction, but they are unrelated to aid allocations. Governments 
with more competitive points, tend to give on average higher levels of sectoral 
subsidies. FDI and portfolio investment follow similar patterns with total aid; 
FDI has some significant negative effects in both cases whereas portfolio 
investment is significantly positively related only once when it comes to 
sectoral aid. Interestingly, trade effects are negative in the case of sectoral 
subsidies and positive in the case of regional aid. But only once in regional aid 
does trade appear to have a significant effect. It confirms, albeit weakly, the 
expectation that greater exposure to trade triggers a positive response. Unlike 
aid to specific firms, governments make political calculations based on regional 
effects. Because firms have operations in several regions, the effects of going 
out of business may reverberate in many areas which don’t vote solidly for the 
government. In contrast, a bleak job outlook in specific bastions of government 
support has an immediate and devastating political effect.   
 
6. Conclusions: Greek exceptionalism revisited 
Does Greece systematically allocate more state aids than the EU average? Is it 
still the exception, the “black sheep” that many politicians and analysts make it 
out to be (Hope and Reed 2002; Simons 1991)? I have presented evidence of 
state aid allocations during the period 1992-2004, showing that Greece is 
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generally not the exception. The effects of globalization refract through 
national institutions shaping the EU member states’ response. Although Greece 
deviates from the EU norm in the cases of sectoral and regional aid, the sectoral 
effect disappears when one accounts for the impact of level of economic 
development and the Simitis government.  
This study has purposefully conducted a difficult test. Whereas much of the 
exceptionalism literature compares Greece to southern EU members—Spain, 
Portugal and occasionally Italy—I broadened the reference group to all EU 
members during the period under investigation (1992-2004) except for 
Luxemburg. The implication of previous estimates is that Greece cannot be 
profitably compared against many northern EU countries because it has 
followed a different political, cultural, economic, and institutional trajectory. 
While the trajectory may have indeed been different, Greek policies have 
followed more or less the same pattern as other EU states, contrary to 
conventional wisdom. One policy cannot definitively settle the question, but it 
appears that in the important case of state aids Greece is part of the rule not the 
exception. Not only that, but in the case of sectoral subsidies it is an example to 
be emulated, systematically disbursing fewer aids that the EU average. There 
have been spectacular failures, such as Olympic Airways, but on average the 
country is doing well. This is not to say that there is no more corruption or 
clientelism. Structural problems persist, and Featherstone (2005) may still be 
right. The evidence presented here merely suggests that the levels of these 
pathologies are no higher in Greece than the average EU state. 
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The effect of Mr. Simitis’ modernization drive may not be as strong as the 
former Prime Minister claims. This does not take away from the monumental 
task facing his administration and its terrific achievements. Change from the 
“old ways” was simply under way several years before he came to power in 
1996. He may have accelerated the pace, but he did not qualitatively change 
total, horizontal, and manufacturing state aid allocations. Only in the case of 
sectoral and regional aids, where Greece is indeed the exception, does he have 
a desirable negative effect on allocation patterns. Whereas Simitis (2005) calls 
it a rift with the traditional conception of the role of the state, evidence suggests 
in many instances more continuity than change. Perhaps partisan politics has 
something to do with his interpretation of events. He became leader of PASOK 
and was elected Prime Minister in 1996 although his own party had been in 
power since late 1993 (and for most of the previous decade). It is possible the 
rift with the old ways of New Democracy and PASOK began with the 
conservatives when they came to power in 1990 or with the socialists in 1993.5 
Unfortunately, the data do not allow for such a test. Answers to this important 
question will have to wait another day. 
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 For instance, compare the arguments and data exchange between the socialist Mr. 
Christodoulakis (2000) and the conservative Mr. Alogoskoufis (2000). Both men are 




Alogoskoufis, George (2000). “The Greek Economy and the Euro,” in 
Achilleas Mitsos and Elias Mossialos (eds.), Contemporary Greece and 
Europe. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 131-155. 
Athens News Agency (2005). February 22. 
Beck, Nathaniel, and Jonathan Katz (1995). “What to Do (and not to Do) with 
Time-Series-Cross-Section Data in Comparative Politics”, American 
Political Science Review, 89:3, 634-647. 
Benoit, B., and R. Milne. (2006) “Germany’s Best-Kept Secret: How its 
Exporters are Beating the World”, Financial Times, May 19, 11. 
Birchfield, Vicki, and Markus Crepaz (1998). “The Impact of Constitutional 
Structures and Collective and Competitive Veto Points on Income 
Inequality in Industrialized Democracies”, European Journal of Political 
Research, 34: 175-200. 
Cameron, David (1978). “The Expansion of the Public Economy: A 
Comparative Analysis”. American Political Science Review, 72:4, 1243-
1261. 
Castles, Francis G. (1998). Comparative Public Policy: Patterns of Post-War 
Transformation. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 
Christodoulakis, Nicos (2000). “The Greek Economy Converging towards 
EMU”, in Achilleas Mitsos and Elias Mossialos (eds.), Contemporary 
Greece and Europe. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 93-114. 
Crepaz, Markus (2001). “Veto Players, Globalization and the Redistributive 
Capacity  of the State: A Panel Study of 15 OECD Countries”, Journal of 
Public Policy, 21:1, 1-22. 
Crepaz, Markus, and Ann. W. Moser (2004). “The Impact of Collective and  
Competitive Veto Points on Public Expenditures in the Global Age”, 
Comparative Political Studies, 37:3, 259-285. 
Dalis, Sotiris (ed.) (1998). From Maastricht to Amsterdam [in Greek]. Athens: 
Sideris. 
Diamandouros, Nikiforos (1993). “Politics and Culture in Greece, 1974–91: An 
Interpretation”, in Richard Clogg (ed.), Greece, 1981–89: The Populist 
Decade. London: Macmillan. 
Dixit, Avinash K., and John Londregan (1995). “Redistributive Politics and 
Economic Efficiency”, American Political Science Review, 89:4, 856-866. 
Featherstone, Kevin (2005). “Introduction: ‘Modernisation and the Structural 
Constraints of Greek Politics”, West European Politics, 28:2, 223-241. 
  28
Featherstone, Kevin, and Dimitris Papadimitriou (2007). “Manipulating Rules, 
Contesting Solutions: Europeanization and the Politics of Restructuring 
Olympic Airways”, Government and Opposition, 42:1, 46-72. 
Fox, John (1991). Regression Diagnostics. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.  
Frangakis, Nikos, and Antonios D. Papayannides (2003). “Greece: A Never-
Ending Story of Mutual Attraction and Estrangement”, in Wolfgang 
Wessels, Andreas Mauer, and Jürgen Mittag (eds.), Fifteen into One? The 
European Union and its Member States. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 166-183. 
Frieden, Jeffry A., and Ronald Rogowski. (1996). “The Impact of the 
International Economy on National Policies: An Analytical Overview”, in 
Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner (eds.), Internationalization and 
Domestic Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 25-47. 
Garrett, Geoffrey, and Peter Lange. (1996) “Internationalization, Institutions, 
and Political Change”, in Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner (eds.),  
Internationalization and Domestic Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 48-75. 
Goodin, Robert E. (1996). “Institutionalizing the Public Interest: The Defence 
of Deadlock and Beyond”, American Political Science Review, 90:2, 331-
343. 
Hall, Peter A. (1999). “The Political Economy of Europe in an Era of 
Interdependence”, in Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary Marks, and 
John D. Stephens (eds.), Continuity and Change in Contemporary 
Capitalism. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 101-
134. 
Hassid, Joseph (1994). “Industrial Policy”, in Panos Kazakos and P. C. 
Ioakimidis (eds.), Greece and EC Membership Evaluated. London: Pinter, 
101-115. 
Hope, Kerin, and John Reed (2002). “Is Poland the New Greece?” Financial 
Times, December 9, 21. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (various years). Yearbook of International 
Financial Statistics. Washington, DC: IMF. 
Ioakimidis, P. C. (1998). European Union and the Greek State [in Greek]. 
Athens: Themelio. 
Kazakos, Panos (2001). Between the State and the Market: The Economy and 
Economic Policy in Post-War Greece, 1944-2000 [in Greek]. Athens: 
Pataki. 
Kazakos, Panos, and P. C. Ioakimidis (eds.) (1994). Greece and EC 
Membership Evaluated. London: Pinter. 
Kono, Daniel Y. (2006). “Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy 
Transparency”, American Political Science Review, 100:3, 369-384. 
  29
Lijphart, Arendt (1999). Patterns of Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press. 
Markou, Chris, George Nakos, and Nikolaos Zahariadis (2001). “Greece: A 
European Paradox,” in Eleanor E. Zeff and Ellen B. Pirro (eds.), The 
European Union and the Member States. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 
217-234. 
Mitsos, Achilleas, and Elias Mossialos (eds.) (2000). Contemporary Greece 
and Europe. Burlington, VT: Ashgate,   
O’Reilly, Robert F. (2005). “Veto Points, Veto Players, and International Trade 
Policy”, Comparative Political Studies, 38:6, 652-675. 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2005). 
International Investment Perspectives. Paris: OECD. 
OECD (2006). OECD Factbook 2006. Paris: OECD. 
Pagoulatos, George (2003). Greece’s New Political Economy: State, Finance 
and Growth from Postwar to EMU. London: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Pagoulatos, George (2004). “Believing in National Exceptionalism: Ideas and 
Economic Divergence in Southern Europe”, West European Politics, 27:1, 
45-70. 
Pagoulatos, George (2005). “The Politics of Privatisation: Redrawing the 
Public-Private Boundary”, West European Politics, 28:2 , 358-380. 
Papadimitriou, Dimitris (2005). The Limits of Engineering Collective Escape: 
The 2000 Reform of the Greek Labour Market”, West European Politics, 
28:2, 381-401. 
Paraskevopoulos, Christos J. (2005). “Developing Infrastructure as a Learning 
Process in Greece”, West European Politics, 28:2, 445-470. 
Radin, Charles (1992). “Many Greeks Question Advantages of EC 
Membership”, Boston Globe, June 19, 2. 
Rodrik, Dani (1998). “Why do more Open Economies Have Bigger 
Governments?” Journal of Political Economy, 106:5, 997-1032. 
Simitis, Kostas (2005). Policy for a Constructive Greece, 1996-2004 [in 
Greek]. Athens: Polis. 
Simons, Marlise (1991) “Club of Europe is Seething about the Greeks”, New 
York Times, April 7, Sec. 4, 2. 
Snape, R. H. (1991). “International Regulation of Subsidies”, The World 
Economy, 14:1, 139-164. 
Soskice, David (1999). “Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and 
Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s”, in Herbert 
Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary Marks, and John D. Stephens (eds.), 
Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism. New York and 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 101-134. 
  30
Sotiropoulos, Dimitri A. (2004). “Southern European Public Bureaucracies in 
Comparative Perspective”, West European Politics, 27:3, 405-422. 
“The Sick Man of Europe,” (1992). The Economist, May 9, 55.  
Tinios, Platon (2005). “Pension Reform in Greece: Reform by Instalments—A 
Blocked Process”, West European Politics, 28:2, 402-419. 
Tsebelis, George (2002). Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Tsoukalis, Loukas (1981). The European Community and its Mediterranean 
Enlargement. London: George Allen & Unwin. 
Verney, Susannah (1996). “The Greek Socialists”, in John Gaffney (ed.), 
Political Parties and the European Union. London: Routledge.  
Zahariadis, Nikolaos. (1997) “Why State Subsidies? Evidence from European  
Community Countries, 1981-86”, International Studies Quarterly 41:2, 
341-354.    
Zahariadis, Nikolaos (2001). “Asset Specificity and State Subsidies in 
Industrialized Countries”, International Studies Quarterly, 45:4, 603-616. 
Zahariadis, Nikolaos (2002). “The Political Economy of State Subsidies in 
Europe”, Policy Studies Journal, 30:2, 285-298. 
 Zahariadis, Nikolaos (2005). “Policy Networks, Elections, and State 
Subsidies”, Review of Policy Research, 22:2, 115-131. 
Zahariadis, Nikolaos (2006a). “Greece: A Most Enthusiastic, Reluctant  
European”, in Eleanor E. Zeff and Ellen B. Pirro (eds.) The European 
Union and the Member States. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 193-
210. 
Zahariadis, Nikolaos (2006b). “Protection for Rent: National Subsidies and the 
European Economy,” annual meeting of the International Political 







Other papers from the Hellenic Observatory 
23.  Klarevas Louis, Greeks Bearing Consensus: An Outline for Increasing Greece's 
Soft Power in the West Hellenic Observatory Discussion Paper No 18, Hellenic 
Observatory, LSE, September 2004 
22.  Koutalakis Charalampos, Environmental Harmonization in Central Eastern 
Europe: Lessons from the Southern Enlargement E-Paper No4, Hellenic 
Observatory, July 2004  
21.  Kamaras Antonis, Market Reforms and Urban Disparity: the cases of Athens and 
Thessaloniki  E-Paper No 3, Hellenic Observatory, LSE, July 2004  
20.  Sotiropoulos Dimitri A., Democratization, Administrative Reform and the State in 
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain: Is There a 'model' of South European 
Bureaucracy? Hellenic Observatory Discussion Paper No17, Hellenic Observatory, 
LSE, April 2004  
19.  Sotiropoulos Dimitri A., Formal Weakness and Informal Strength: Civil Society 
in Contemporary Greece Hellenic Observatory Discussion Paper No16, Hellenic 
Observatory, LSE, February 2004  
18.  Klarevas Louis, The Eagle and the Phoenix: The United States and the Greek 
Coup of 1967 Hellenic Observatory Discussion Paper  No 15, Hellenic Observatory, 
LSE,  January 2004  
17.  Papaspyrou Theodoros, EMU strategies: Lessons from Greece in view of the EU 
Enlargement (Graph, Table) Hellenic Observatory Discussion Paper  No 14, Hellenic 
Observatory, LSE,  January 2004  
16.  Papadimitriou Dimitris, The limits of engineering collective escape: the 2000 
reform of the Greek labour market Hellenic Observatory Discussion Paper No13, 
Hellenic Observatory, LSE, October 2003 (also published as Hellenic Observatory E-
paper No2)  
15.  Featherstone Kevin, The Politics of Pension Reform in Greece: modernization 
defeated by gridlock Hellenic Observatory Discussion Paper No12, Hellenic 
Observatory, LSE, October 2003 (also published as Hellenic Observatory E-paper 
No1)  
14.  Stavridis Stelios, Assessing the views of academics in Greece on the 
Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy: a critical appraisal and a research agenda 
proposal, Hellenic Observatory Discussion Paper No11, Hellenic Observatory, LSE, 
September 2003  
13.  Stavridis Stelios, The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy: A Literature 
Review, Hellenic Observatory Discussion Paper No10, Hellenic Observatory, LSE, 
September 2003 
  2
12.  Bratsis Peter, The Constitution of the Greek-Americans, Hellenic Observatory 
Discussion Paper No9, Hellenic Observatory, LSE, August 2003 
11.  Bratsis Peter, Corrupt Compared to What? Greece, Capitalist Interests, and the 
Specular Purity of the State Hellenic Observatory Discussion Paper No8, Hellenic 
Observatory, LSE, August 2003 
10.  Anastasakis Othon and Bojicic-Dzelilovic Vesna Balkan Regional Cooperation & 
European Integration Hellenic Observatory Policy Paper No2, Hellenic Observatory, 
LSE, July 2002  
9.    Stavrakakis Yannis, Religion and Populism: Reflections on the ‘politicised’ 
discourse of the Greek Church Hellenic Observatory Discussion Paper No7, Hellenic 
Observatory, LSE, May 2002 
8.    Stefanidis Ioannis D., Pressure Groups and Greek Foreign Policy, 1945-67 
Hellenic Observatory Discussion Paper No6, Hellenic Observatory, LSE,  December 
2001 
7.    Tsoukalis Loukas (ed.) Globalisation & Regionalism: A double Challenge For 
Greece Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Athens 
2001 (hard-copy only, available upon request; please post a cheque of £10 payable to 
"LSE" to: The Hellenic Observatory, European Institute, LSE, Houghton Street, 
London WC2A 2AE, UK)  
6.    Woodward Susan L., Milosevic Who? Origins of the New Balkans Hellenic 
Observatory Discussion Paper No5, Hellenic Observatory, LSE, July 2001 
5.    Kamaras Antonis, A Capitalist Diaspora: The Greeks in the Balkans Hellenic 
Observatory Discussion Paper No4, Hellenic Observatory, LSE, June 2001 
4.    Anastasakis Othon, Extreme Right in Europe: A Comparative Study of Recent 
Trends Hellenic Observatory Discussion Paper No3, Hellenic Observatory, LSE, 
November 2000 
3.    Holm Erik, High Politics and European Integration: From EMU to CFSP 
Hellenic Observatory Discussion Paper No2, Hellenic Observatory, LSE, November 
2000  
2.    Rozakis Christos, The Protection of Human Rights in Europe: Evolving Trends 
and Prospects Hellenic Observatory Discussion Paper No1, Hellenic Observatory, 
LSE, October 2000 
1.    Gligorov, V., Kaldor, M., and Tsoukalis, L. Balkan Reconstruction and European 
Integration Hellenic Observatory Policy Paper No1 (jointly with the Centre for the 
Study of Global Governance, LSE and the Vienna Institute for International 
Economic Studies), October 1999 
 
